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ECONOMETRICA 
VOLUME 50 MAY, 1982 NUMBER 3 
ASSET VALUATION IN AN EXPERIMENTAL MARKET 
BY ROBERT FORSYTHE, THOMAS R. PALFREY, AND CHARLES R. PLOTT' 
The time path of asset prices is studied within a stationary experimental environment. 
After several replications prices converge to a perfect foresight equilibrium. A sequential 
market having an "informational trap" and a futures market are also studied. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THEORIES OF ASSET PRICES have occupied a very special place in the history of 
economic doctrine as being both important and diverse. Importance is estab- 
lished with the key role of time in the analysis. Almost every economic commod- 
ity exists over time thereby manifesting one of the essential features of an asset. 
Diversity also follows from the incorporation of time because of the potential 
applicability of a host of subtheories which differ according to "motivational 
spirit" and rigor of development. Competing subtheories about the nature of 
choice over time, choice under uncertainty, learning and the informational 
content of prices can all lead to different theories of asset prices. In addition any 
theory of asset prices necessarily involves many parameters (information states, 
a priori expectations, preferences over time, etc.). As a result the discipline 
frequently has difficulty identifying a solid empirical base upon which to justify 
the acceptance or rejection of competing theories. This paper represents a first 
attempt to explore the potential of laboratory markets for adding to such base 
that exists. 
The behavior of five different asset markets is reported. The markets were 
created in a laboratory environment and were very simple relative to the asset 
markets found in natural environments. The purpose of studying the simple 
markets is to find unambiguous answers to the following questions. (a) Do these 
asset markets exhibit any regularities relative to their organization and underly- 
ing parameters? (b) If regularities exist do they conform to the predictions of any 
of the standard mathematical models when the latter are applied in a natural 
way? 
If the answer to either of these questions is "no" then one would be very 
suspicious of applications of the same models to more complicated markets. 
Models which are supposed to work in general should be expected to work in 
simple special cases. Obviously success of a model in simple special cases does 
not imply that the model will work in general and we make no such claim. 
Rather, we view the results reported here as simply a base upon which the study 
of more complicated situations can be conducted. 
'The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The 
comments of William Brock, David Cass, Katherine Echol, Charles Holt, and James Jordan have 
been helpful. We also thank George Fox for his help in conducting the experiments. 
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In addition to the questions above some purely methodological questions are 
posed. The experiments themselves involved some experimental techniques that 
had not been used before. It was necessary to determine whether or not these 
techniques exerted an independent influence on market behavior before further 
studies could be conducted. 
The theories we call upon can be divided into two broad classes. However, 
before discussing theories we should note the existence of nontheories asserted in 
newspapers and social commentaries. These are in effect claims that asset prices 
are arbitrary. Such prices depend upon the idiosyncratic nature of individual 
behavior and convey little or no information at all about the states of the world 
or the magnitude of economic parameters. Some implications of this belief are 
that there are no reasons to study asset markets because there is nothing to learn 
and those who claim there is are confusing religion with science. Needless to say, 
most economists would disagree with this view and tend to dismiss it as "table 
talk" or "uninformed chatter" which is of no concern. It never appears in 
academic journals (at least we could find no good quotes). The fact is, however, 
that the profession has no simple way to disconfirm seemingly outlandish beliefs 
when held by skeptical students, colleagues in other disciplines, and decision- 
making politicians. 
The first class of theories holds that asset prices are not arbitrary. Indeed the 
prices may exhibit a great deal of regularity. Those who accept theories of this 
first type would claim that the regularities may have very little, if anything, to do 
with underlying economics or the economy. Instead asset prices follow laws of 
random motion such as martingales. The only information that P, conveys might 
be something about the probability of various prices in the past. The implication 
of this line of theory is that one might study charts, charting techniques, and 
various other models of stochastic processes. 
Included in this class of theories, would be purely expectational equilibria 
similar to one put forth by Keynes. The essential idea is captured in the following 
selection from his General Theory: 
Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened to those 
newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces 
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most 
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each 
competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds the prettiest, but those which 
he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at 
the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the 
best of one's judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion 
genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And 
there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees (Keynes [10, p. 
156]). 
While one may argue about what Keynes "really means" one natural conclusion 
from such a behavioral hypothesis is that for any set of vectors of returns to 
individuals virtually any price vector can be an equilibrium given the proper set 
of beliefs. This is possible because each individual bases his valuations, and 
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hence his choices, entirely on the expected valuations of other individuals without 
stipulating any connection with an underlying stream of returns from holding the 
asset. In essence, all investors are viewed as short-run speculators who are not 
concerned with the stream of returns generated directly from holding the asset. 
Here the informational content of prices is, loosely speaking, a reflection of the 
"average" trader's expectations of future prices of the asset. 
The second set of theories all hold that asset prices exhibit regularities that are 
systematically related to the underlying returns generated by the asset. All such 
models stipulate a consistency among expected individual returns, possible 
capital gains and individual choice behavior, but they differ on how these are 
related. Individual learning models, for example, have individuals forming expec- 
tations about price changes and the asset price being determined by choices 
based on both those expectations and the individual's expected stream of 
dividend returns from holding the asset (Easley [2], Jordan [9], and Townsend 
[17]). The rational expectations hypothesis and the related perfect foresight 
equilibrium concept stipulate a further direct consistency between expectations 
and the actual price behavior (see, for example, Harrison and Kreps [8]). The 
efficient market hypothesis extends the relationship to the speed with which 
economic events are translated into market prices by claiming that "prices at any 
time fully reflect all available information" (Fama [3, p. 383]). 
These three categories (one class of nontheories and two classes of theories) are 
intended only as a means of organizing our thoughts and discussions. Clearly 
they do not capture the details of the wide variety and complexity of existing 
models. The formal development of specific models is contained in Section 4. 
2. THE LABORATORY MARKETS 
The economic properties of each of the five markets we studied are listed 
below. It is hoped that the study of such special cases will lead to clearly 
interpretable results despite the complexities of individual and market behavior 
that is observed in laboratory environments. 
(a) Each market year had two periods, A and B. All period A's (in a market) 
were identical in terms of the underlying distribution of returns and all period 
B's in a market were identical. Thus each year was in a sense a replication of 
previous years. 
(b) Each experiment consisted of a fixed group of subjects who participated in 
a sequence of six to eight market years. Each period A and each period B was 
seven minutes long. 
(c) Assets had a one-year life. The supply of assets was constant for all periods 
of all years. 
(d) Individual monetary returns from assets in any given period of a year were 
linear in the number of units of the asset held. That is, individual i received 
returns (dividends) dA for each unit of the asset held at the end of any period A 
and dB' for each unit of the asset held at the end of any period B. 
(e) Individuals were partitioned into trader "types." Individuals of a given 
trader type had identical returns but the returns differed across types. 
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(f) The markets were organized as oral double auctions.2 All individuals were 
present for all periods. All bids, offers, and contracts were public and recorded 
publicly so the cost of gathering such information was minimal. Possibilities for 
explicit collusion did not exist. 
(g) No short sales were permitted. This means that there was a fixed supply of 
the asset. 
(h) Markets occurred sequentially except in Experiment 5. 
(i) No futures markets existed with the exception of Experiment 5. In this 
market a period B futures market replaced the period B spot market. 
Five markets were studied using subjects who were undergraduate male and 
female students at the California Institute of Technology. In three of the markets 
(Experiments 3, 4, and 5), only subjects who had been in one of the first two 
experiments were used and thus could be considered experienced. 
In Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5 there were nine traders; in Experiment 4 there 
were eight. At the beginning of a trading year each trader was endowed with 
two3 "certificates" which had no face value but paid a "dividend" at the end of 
each of the two periods, A and B, during the year. The value of the dividend 
depended upon the individual and the period. That is, each certificate held by 
individual i at the end of a period could yield $X to individual i while each 
certificate held by individual j could yield $ Y to individual j. Furthermore, a 
certificate could yield a different amount to a given individual in period A than it 
yielded to the same individual during period B. Because of these differences, 
there are gains from exchange with one individual selling the certificate to 
another. 
The difference in individual returns was used only after considerable thought. 
The importance of the feature for the laboratory market is clear enough-it 
fosters the existence of gains from exchange. In addition, there are a number of 
reasons why streams of returns in naturally occurring markets might generally be 
different for different investors or for the same investor at different times. First 
of all, the evaluation of services of actual physical assets such as durable 
consumption goods might be greatest during early periods for some owners, 
while other owners might place a greater value in later periods. Secondly, for 
financial assets such as stocks for which the returns are dividends, different 
owners might be in different tax brackets or different risk classes. With the latter 
interpretation, (dA, dB) might be considered as a set of "certainty equivalent" 
dividends, different for each risk class. Third, the investors may all be risk 
neutral and simply have different expectations over the streams of returns, which 
in fact are random variables. 
The parameters for the five markets are given in Table I. The currency used in 
the experiments was called francs. Value for francs was established by applica- 
tion of the theory of induced value (Smith [15], Plott [12]). In Experiments 1, 2, 
and 5 each franc was worth $.002, in Experiment 3 each franc was worth $.001 
2See the Appendix for instructions with the exact trading rules. 
31n Experiment 4 each trader was endowed with three certificates. 
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TABLE I 
EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
Initial Initial Dollar Period A Period B 
Experiment Investor Francs on Certificate Value of Fixed Dividend Dividend Number of 
Number Type Hand Holdings Francs Cost Value Value Investors 
1&2 I 10,000 2 .002 10,000 300 50 3 
II 10,000 2 .002 10,000 50 300 3 
III 10,000 2 .002 10,000 150 250 3 
3 I 20,000 2 .001 20,000 600 350 3 
II 20,000 2 .001 20,000 350 600 3 
III 20,000 2 .001 20,000 450 550 3 
4 I 12,100 3 .01 13,000 150 50 4 
II 12,100 3 .01 13,000 100 250 4 
5 I 15,000 2 .002 15,500 403 146 3 
II 15,000 2 .002 15,500 284 372 3 
III 15,000 2 .002 15,500 110 442 3 
and in Experiment 4 each franc was worth $.01. These conversion values may 
seem small at first but in fact the transaction prices in terms of francs were 
sufficiently high to make the dollar payoffs and values of decisions comparable 
to other experiments which have been successfully completed with subjects 
drawn from these subject pools. The average amount earned by a trader was 
about $16 for two and one-half hours participation. 
Table I is read as follows. Consider Experiment 1 where there were three 
different types of investors with three individuals of each type. Each of the three 
was given 10,000 francs and two certificates at the beginning of each year. They 
were then allowed to trade freely according to their wishes subject to well- 
established rules during the year. Each certificate held at the end of period A 
yielded 300 francs and each held at the end of period B yielded 50 francs. They 
could also add to their franc holdings by selling certificates either from their 
endowments or from the ones they had purchased for potentially profitable 
resale. All francs held in excess of 10,000 francs were translated into dollars at 
the rate of $.002 per franc and this was the amount of money the individual was 
allowed to keep. The payoff for all other groups and all other experiments should 
be interpreted similarly. 
As will be discussed below several models can be applied to predict what will 
evolve from these simple markets. Looking ahead, however, will enable the 
reader to understand the structure and interrelations among the experiments. The 
first three experiments can be explained rather well by a perfect foresight 
equilibrium model (to be described below). The remaining two experiments were 
then designed to explore some slightly different markets using the insights gained 
from the first three. Once a positive result has been established it is only natural 
to initiate an inquiry which seeks deeper reasons about why the model works and 
if it will continue to work under other parameters, institutions, and complica- 
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tions. Experiment 4 represents an attempt to create a market by simple parame- 
ter adjustments which would equilibrate to an inefficient allocation. Experiment 
5 involves an institutional perturbation-a futures market. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
The instructions contained in the Appendix are an extension of those used in 
other studies. Two major exceptions to traditional procedures were used, how- 
ever, and should be emphasized because of their importance in assessing the 
methodological contribution of the experiments. 
The first involves the use of francs. With the exception of Friedman's [4] study 
of cooperative duopoly, other experiments have used dollars directly as a 
medium of exchange. For these experiments, in which initial endowments of 
certificates were distributed costlessly, and in which separation of theoretical 
predictions required the use of relatively high nominal prices, the cost of using 
dollars directly would have been prohibitive. Thus payoffs here for a given year 
are of the form $ = a + bx where b > 0, a < 0, and x is the quantity of francs 
held at the end of a trading year. While this theoretically should have no 
influence on behavior, it does involve a change in procedures relative to other 
experiments and is thus a candidate explanation for any problems which might 
occur. 
The second break with tradition involves the nonpayment of commissions. It is 
known that the absence of trading commissions can cause slight divergences 
from demand and supply predictions (Plott and Smith [13]). Current theory holds 
that trading involves a slight cost which is overcome by a commission. Thus the 
lack of a trading commission can induce some small inaccuracies in models. On 
the other hand, the existence of a commission, since individuals can be on both 
sides of the market simultaneously, can lead to an infinite number of trades. The 
latter possibility was considered to be a greater problem than the former so 
commissions were omitted. 
4. HYPOTHESES AND SPECIFIC MODELS 
Our formal analysis will be concentrated upon models motivated by the 
second class of theories. If the models fail to work, then we would look to 
opinions in the first two classes of ideas (the "nontheory" class and the first 
theory class) for structuring future research priorities. On the other hand, if the 
models work, then we know the market behavior predicted by the first two views 
is not pervasive. The next steps would then involve attempts to understand why 
such models work and isolate the range of circumstances in which they can be 
relied upon. Perhaps ideas in the first classes are relevant when the situation 
becomes sufficiently rich but that can only be established by building up results 
from the simple cases which can (potentially) be thoroughly understood. 
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A two-period model for a discrete homogeneous asset seems to be the natural 
one to apply. There are n types of investors, each of whom "knows" his/her 
stream of returns, (dA, dB) for i = 1,2, . . ., from owning a unit of the asset in 
periods A and B. The investors have no effective wealth limitations, but they 
possess a finite amount of the asset and there are no short sales. Furthermore, 
except for Experiment 5, the markets are sequential. The market for period B 
holdings occurs after the market for period A holdings has closed. 
Price predictions for period B are the same for almost all models. Direct 
application of a demand and supply model yields 
PB= max d . 
This follows from the constant per unit yields and the fixed supply. For 
experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 the predicted period B prices in francs are (300, 300, 
600, 250) respectively. As shown in Figure 1 the demand function is perfectly 
elastic up to the wealth limitation of those who have the highest period B yields. 
The wealth limitation was sufficiently large in the experiment that it was never 
binding. Presumably the limit prices for such individuals are the per unit yield 
and the maximum quantity demanded is constrained only by the initial alloca- 
tion of francs. The supply of certificates is fixed. 
This model yields our first hypothesis. It is known that experimental markets 
do not attain equilibrium immediately. Instead they tend to converge. Assuming 
traders impute zero costs to making transactions, there is a natural prediction 
about the average price during period B of the final year, PB. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
PT= max d. 
In light of the results obtained by Plott and Smith [13] and Smith [15] about 
transaction costs and the role of commissions in experimental double-auction 
markets, the assumption that traders impute zero costs to making transactions is 
not realistic. Therefore, we also state a more general version of the above 
hypothesis which takes account of these costs. Denoting the transaction cost by 
c, we have: 
HYPOTHESIS 1': For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
T= max(di - C). 
Prediction of period A prices is more involved. In the sequential market 
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Currency 
Prices 
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B~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I I 
?0 w' w' 
1 
+w' w + w '+ " 
d Is d 1Bl d;B 
dB: dividend of type i investor. Refer to Table 1. 
QO: totol supply of certificotes in period B. 
WO: holding of currency ot the beginning of period B by investor i. 
FIGURE 1-Period B theoretical demand and supply schedules. 
structure informational assumptions are crucial for determining the nature of 
competing models of period A prices. Three different models will be considered. 
First, it might be assumed that investors bring only their private information to 
bear on their market decisions and invest accordingly. Under this hypothesis, 
they take no account of potential speculative gains to be made in period B. The 
period A equilibrium price which results from the appropriate demand and 
supply model is 
P -=max(di + di) 
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This will be referred to as the naive price equilibrium.4 For experiments 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 these period A prices in francs are 400, 400, 1000, and 250 respectively. 
Assuming zero transaction costs, this leads to our alternative prediction about the 
average period A contract price in the final year. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
= i (d + B' 
We have called this the "naive expectations hypothesis." 
Taking account of transaction costs, we have: 
HYPOTHESIS 2': For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
PA =max (dA + dB - c). 
A second view of period A price formation is motivated by the insight that 
market behavior may be influenced by individuals who attempt to earn short- 
term capital gains in addition to dividend returns. This view would be consistent 
with observing a period A equilibrium price which exceeds the naive price. More 
specifically PA' is a reasonable lower bound for the period A price for the 
following reason. Let i* satisfy 
PN= d* + d d 2 d Vj i*. 
Then any investor of type i* is guaranteed PAN in dividend earnings from every 
certificate owned or purchased in period A. Another way of saying this is that i* 
does not need to depend on capital gains in order to earn PAN. Thus such an 
investor is willing to purchase an infinite amount at prices below PAN even 
without information about PB. Thus PA provides one theoretical bound for PA 
This line of reasoning yields a third prediction which is stated in a testable 
form in Hypothesis 3. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
PA' >max(dA + dB ) (t = 1, 2, . . ., T). 
The next model is the rational expectations, or in this case, the perfect 
foresight equilibrium model. The demand in period A is augmented by the 
4Katherine Echol suggests that this should be called the maximin equilibrium and that a true 
"naive" equilibrium would have traders determining values on the basis of one-period dividends 
alone. This type of myopic behavior was probably circumvented by question one of the practice 
calculations section of the instructions. 
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perfectly forecasted theoretical equilibrium price of period B. That is, 
= max d, + PB = max dA + max di. 
For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 the numbers, PAF, in franc prices are 600, 600, 
1200, and 400 respectively. Again assuming the traders in these experimental 
markets impute zero costs in making transactions, this model yields the next 
prediction. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
= PA =max dA + max dL. 
We call this the "perfect foresight hypothesis." 
Taking transaction costs into account we have: 
HYPOTHESIS 4': For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
AT= PA 2c = max(dA' - c) + max(di - c). 
Some controversy exists about the mechanism through which a rational 
expectations equilibrium might be achieved. Grossman [61 suggests that the key is 
replication and that with replication investors will acquire information about the 
joint distribution of prices which determines the equilibrium price function. With 
replication investors have the opportunity to observe period B prices and 
incorporate this information into their decisions in the period A market. Not only 
does this argument suggest something about the necessity of replication for the 
existence of a rational expectations equilibrium, it also suggests something about 
the time path of prices through which the equilibrium will be attained. The next 
hypothesis captures the idea about the nature of convergence motivated by the 
Grossman model. 
HYPOTHESIS 5: For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
IPA - PA > IPB - PBI for all t. 
In other words, convergence in period A "follows" convergence in period B. We 
call this the "swing-back hypothesis." 
In these markets investors enter in year one with no idea (or perhaps only a 
vague idea in the case of "experienced" investors) of the market price and they 
learn more about it in each subsequent year. Specifically in year one investors 
bring only their own private information to the market place. However, the 
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perfect foresight equilibrium implicitly requires agents to possess information 
which they will normally receive by observing prices. Once prices are observed 
the lack of information which previously impeded attainment of a perfect 
foresight equilibrium no longer exists. Due to this, one would expect the trading 
to begin at the naive equilibrium price and monotonically converge to the perfect 
foresight equilibrium price as trading publicizes information that originally was 
private. In the absence of a period B futures market, investors will be unable to 
incorporate period B price information in their period A decisions until after the 
first year of trading. Implicit in this observation is Grossman's notion that in 
such markets replication is a necessary condition for convergence to a perfect 
foresight equilibrium when only sequential spot trading is allowed. This is the 
sixth hypothesis and only applies to a sequential market organization in which 
futures markets are absent. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: For experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
(a) P I 
(b) PFA 'A - PA > O, for t > 1. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 suggest that a very careful look at Experiment 4 is in 
order. This experiment represented an attempt to "trap" the market at an 
equilibrium other than that embodied in Hypothesis 4 by using the convergence 
path suggested by Hypotheses 5 and 6. The parameters of Experiment 4 are such 
that in the naive equilibrium no trade takes place in period B. As a result there 
would be no transacted price signals in period B and so PB would not be known 
to the agents in subsequent years. Notice that for j E I, dS + d; = 200 and for 
i E II, dA + dB = 350 (see Table I). Thus under the naive hypothesis type II 
investors would purchase the entire supply in period A. Type II also has the 
higher return in period B so they are demanders in period B as well as in period 
A. Since the demanders in period B hold the entire supply, no trades would 
occur in B. However notice that for i E II, dA' + PB = 100 + 250 = 350 but for 
j E I, dA + PB = 150 + 250 = 400. Thus according to the perfect foresight equi- 
librium model group I should hold all certificates in period A and sell to group II 
in period B. Experiment 4 was designed after the first three experiments and was 
intended as a check on the nature of the mechanisms which might motivate the 
perfect foresight equilibrium. 
Experiment 5 involves a change in the market structure. A futures market is 
opened for period B holdings which is held concurrently (in time) with the period 
A spot market. From a static theoretical view this institutional perturbation 
makes no difference in the ultimate equilibrium values. The perfect foresight 
equilibrium values in francs are (845, 442) in periods A and B respectively. The 
natural conjecture is: 
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HYPOTHESIS 7: Hypotheses 1 through 6 apply to Experiment 5. 
The more interesting aspects, however, are the implications about the necessity 
of replication for convergence to the perfect foresight equilibrium. Those who 
subscribe to the replication justification for the perfect foresight equilibrium, 
would argue that period A prices should converge more rapidly in the presence 
of a futures market. This is because simultaneous markets allow information 
about capital gains to be incorporated immediately into investor decisions. This 
hypothesis is formalized as (where S stands for any of the experiments involving 
sequential markets; PA's is the period A perfect foresight price in sequential 
market experiment S, S = 1, 2, 3, 4): 
HYPOTHESIS 8: 
I PA5 PA 51 I PA S-PA S It- 1, 2, T) 
F F N 
I PA5 PA 51 I PA S PA S Iv , ..., 
Of particular interest in this respect is t = 1 because immediate convergence 
TABLE II 
NUMBER OF UNITS HELD IN A THEORETICAL EQUILIBRIUM 
EXPERIMENTS 1, 2, 3, 5 
Investor Type 
Period Period Period Period Period Period 
A B A B A B 
Naive 
Equilibrium 0 0 0 9 9 0 
Perfect 
Foresight 
Equilibrium 9 0 0 9 0 0 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Investor Type 
I 
Period Period Period Period 
A B A B 
Naive 
Equilibrium 0 0 8 8 
Perfect 
Foresight 
Equilibrium 8 0 0 8 
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would demonstrate that the futures market removes the necessity for any 
replication at all. 
The final set of hypotheses deals with the distribution of certificates. Within 
these markets each theory makes a rather precise prediction about which individ- 
uals will hold certificates. As can be seen the naive expectations model 
and the perfect foresight model make very precise predictions. They yield two 
very different hypotheses about certificate holdings. 
HYPOTHESIS 9F: Certificate holdings are the same as the holdings predicted by 
the perfect foresight model (see Table II). 
HYPOTHESIS 9N: Certificate holdings are the same as the holdings predicted 
by the naive expectations model (see Table II). 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Our analysis of the data is contained in three categories: price convergence, 
quantity convergence, and individual behavior. In dealing with the data we face 
some open problems that are being encountered in almost all experimental work 
where the cost of conducting experiments places a significant constraint on the 
number of observations. As will be obvious in the figures, the high degree of 
serial correlation of prices in a given experiment, both within a period and across 
periods, suggests the simultaneous interaction of the learning process by individu- 
als and a convergence process by the market. Yet, without a theory about these 
processes, our statistical statements suffer from an inability to use all the data 
available to us. Furthermore, the statistical tests we report should be regarded 
more as measures than classical hypothesis tests. Fortunately, the data from these 
experiments show sufficient regularities so that this should cause no problems. 
A. Price Convergence 
Figures 2-6 present the entire time series of transacted prices in the five 
experiments that were conducted. For every experiment, average price in each 
period of each year is given at the bottom of the corresponding figure. After 
repeated trials the period B price is accurately predicted by the simple supply 
and demand model in all experiments. Period B prices are always within the $.02 
of PB in dollar terms by the final year. The observation that the observed prices 
stay consistently $.01 or $.02 below the predicted price is consistent with findings 
by Plott and Smith [13] that participants in these experimental markets impute a 
slight cost to trading. 
Table III summarizes the data from Figures 2-6 and gives price predictions 
when the simple supply and demand model is modified to take account of 
transactions costs. Although the observed mean period B prices in the final year 
of the experiments are all significantly (at the 1 per cent level) less than the 
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TABLE III 
OBSERVED AVERAGE PRICES AND THEORETICAL PERFECT FORESIGHT PRICE PREDICTIONS 
WITH TRANSACTION COSTS 
Observed Mean 
Transactions Prices (in Francs) Predicted by 
Price in Final Hypotheses I' and 4', Corrected for Year (Standard Transaction Cost, c 
Experiment Errors are in 
Number Period Parentheses) c = $.01 c = $.03 c = $.05 
A 576.25a 
(2.76) 590 570 550 
B 295.00a 
(0.0) 295 285 275 
A 541.43c 
(4.73) 590 570 550 
2 
B 293.56a 
(1.43) 295 285 275 
A 1180.36a 
(3.28) 1180 1140 1100 
3 
B 592.50a 
(.61) 590 570 550 
A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A 3937 71b 
(.38) 398 394 390 
B 249.50a 
(.10) 249 247 245 
A 831.07 b 
(.57) 835 815 795 
S 
B 437.06a 
(.34) 437 427 417 
aAt the 10 per cent significance level, one can reject the hypothesis that the observed mean transaction price is 
less than the predicted price, corrected for a transaction cost of $.01. 
bAt the 10 per cent significance level, one can reject the hypothesis that the observed mean transaction price is 
less than the predicted price, corrected for a transaction cost of $.03. 
cAt the 10 per cent significance level, one can reject the hypothesis that the observed mean transaction price is 
less than the predicted price, corrected for a transaction cost of $.05. 
predicted prices under an assumption of zero transactions costs, none of these 
observed mean period B prices are significantly less than the predicted prices 
(even at a significance level as high as 10 per cent) if the participants of the 
markets impute a $.01 cost to trading. 
The perfect foresight equilibrium model (hypotheses 4 and 4') is very strongly 
supported by the period A price data. With one exception (Experiment 2), the 
average period A transacted price in the final year of each experiment was within 
$.05 at PjF. Experiment 2 lasted only seven years but the price in year seven was 
within $.12 of PF and mirrored almost exactly the experience in Experiment 1 
which was also about $.12 away from pA in year seven. As was the case for 
period B prices, the period A prices also indicate that the imputed cost of trading 
is very low. In Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 5 the average prices in the period A of 
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the final year are not significantly less (at the 1 per cent level) than the 
predictions of the perfect foresight model if the participants impute a trading cost 
of $.03 (see Table III). 
Hypothesis 3, which states that naive expectations provide a lower bound for 
prices, is almost a direct implication of Hypothesis 4; it is not particularly 
surprising that all five experiments support Hypothesis 3 for years beyond year 
two. Simple hypothesis testing allows us to reject the naive expectations Hypothe- 
sis 2 at any significance level. Note that Hypotheses 2 and 4 give mutually 
inconsistent price predictions for these markets and are sufficiently different that 
the strong support for Hypothesis 4 implies the rejection of Hypothesis 2. 
The "swing-back" Hypothesis 5 that period B convergence precedes period A 
convergence was supported in all experiments. The relevant inequality was 
satisfied in every year. This reaffirms the crucial importance of price as a carrier 
of market information. 
The experiments support Hypothesis 6, that convergence in experiments 1-4 
will be from below beginning at the naive price. In three out of four experiments 
average price was at or below PA' in year one (Experiments 1, 2, and 3). In two 
out of four experiments prices were not significantly different from PA' (at the 5 
per cent level) even during year two (Experiments 1 and 2). 
Both Hypotheses 7 and 8 pertain to Experiment 5 alone. Hypothesis 7 (that the 
first six experiments extend to the case of futures markets) can be accepted on 
the basis of the above discussion with one important caveat. With a period B 
futures market (Experiment 5) the period A price in year one was much greater 
than PA . In fact, it was halfway between the naive price and the perfect foresight 
price. We suggest that this was observed because individuals were able to obtain 
information about the period B price before making period A transactions. This 
theory, if ultimately supported, would also explain why Hypothesis 8 was 
supported. (Hypothesis 8 asserts that period A price will converge more rapidly 
with a futures market.) The relevant inequality, defined in Hypothesis 8, was 
satisfied in every case. 
Our intuition that the existence of a no-trade equilibrium at naive prices would 
prevent or impede convergence to the Pareto optimal perfect foresight equilib- 
rium was not supported. In Experiment 4 which was designed to explore this 
possibility, speculative investment by one investor (who had participated in an 
earlier experiment) drove the market away from the inefficient price in early 
years to an efficient, market-clearing (zero excess demand) price by the end of 
the final year. It appears that this phenomenon permitted the perfect foresight 
equilibrium to be reached in that experiment. 
B. Quantity Convergence and Efficiency 
The predictions about quantity convergence and efficiency of the experimental 
asset markets were very accurate. Predicted quantities (according to Hypothesis 
9F) are 100 per cent accurate after the first year in Experiment 5, the second year 
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TABLE IV 
NUMBER OF UNITS OF ASSET ON "WRONG SIDE OF MARKET" 
UNDER PERFECT FORESIGHT HYPOTHESIS 
Year 
Experiment 
Number Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
la A 17 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 
B 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2a A 10 3 0 0 0 1 0 
B 5 3 0 0 1 1 0 
3a A 16 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 
B 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4b A 12 1 0 0 0 0 
B 2 0 0 0 0 0 
5a A 3 0 0 0 0 0 
B 5 0 0 0 0 0 
18 units in the market. 
b24 units in the market. 
in Experiment 4, and the third year in Experiment 1. Predicted quantities are 97 
per cent accurate after the second year in Experiments 2 and 3. We conclude that 
Hypothesis 9F cannot be rejected and that Hypothesis 9N can be rejected after 
the first year. Note that quantity convergence is faster when the period B futures 
market exists in Experiment 5 (especially as compared with Experiment 3 where 
subjects were also experienced). 
Percentage of maximum possible total payout is used as a measure of effi- 
ciency in a market year (as opposed to a period) of an experiment. There is only 
one source of inefficiency in these markets. Inefficiency occurs if and only if a 
"wrong type" of investor is holding assets at the end of a period. One can easily 
see the relationship between quantity convergence and efficiency in these experi- 
ments. Complete efficiency occurs if and only if quantities are allocated accord- 
ing to Table II. That is, complete efficiency occurs if and only if quantities are 
allocated according to the rational expectations theory. In each of the experi- 
ments, type II investors should be holding all units of the asset in period B, and 
type I investors should be holding all the units at the end of period A. 
Table IV shows the number of units of the asset which are "on the wrong side 
of the market." When this number is 0 in periods A and B, that means that type 
I investors are the only holders at the end of period A and type II investors are 
the only holders at the end of period B. If this is true, no matter what the price is, 
the allocation is efficient. Considering the first year only, of the first four 
experiments 66 units of 156 were on the wrong side of the market. Then in year 
three and later in the same experiments only nine out of a possible 804 units are 
held by investors on the wrong side of the market. Thus, after only three years 
the quantity predictions by the perfect foresight equilibrium model are almost 
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TABLE V 
PAYOUT AS A PER CENT OF MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EFFICIENCY LEVELS PAYOUTa 
Per Cent of 
Year Maximum Payment 
Experiment under Naive 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Hypothesis 
1 21.19 66.67 89.05 100 100 100 100 100 33.32 
2 50.01 99.28 100 100 98.82 94.99 100 33.32 
3 54.74 76.19 100 100 89.25 100 100 100 59.53 
4 60.17 98.17 100 100 100 100 60.00 
5 77.06 100 100 100 100 100 26.58 
Per cent of maximum total payout was calculated relative to original endowments. That is, if all 
participants in the market make no trades and are just paid on the basis of their original endowments only, 
then according to our measure, the per cent of maximum total payout is 0.0. 
100 per cent correct. In Experiment 5 the model is 100 per cent correct after only 
one period, thus adding support for the hypothesis that the futures market causes 
more rapid convergence of the spot market. 
The efficiency levels in Table V mirror the quantity predictions. After the 
second year, efficiency levels remain at near 100 per cent in all experiments. 
Except for Experiment 5 the efficiency levels attained in the first year approxi- 
mate those predicted under the naive hypothesis. With a futures market, how- 
ever, the efficiency level in the first year (77 per cent) was well above that 
predicted under the naive hypothesis (27 per cent). 
Both the quantity and efficiency data provide strong evidence that these 
markets began at the naive equilibrium but ultimately converged to a rational 
expectations equilibrium. Only when a futures market existed (Experiment 5) did 
the market appear to bypass the naive equilibrium and converge immediately to 
the more efficient perfect foresight equilibrium. 
C. Individual Behavior 
In simple markets like these one might think that individual behavior is simple 
or "mechanical" and that the resulting market behavior is therefore "obvious." 
There are three observations about individual behavior which seemed particu- 
larly interesting in this respect and suggest that individual behavior is compli- 
cated. Both types of behavior are difficult to explain. One such observed action 
we will refer to as "overlapping." That is, investors do not always treat transacted 
price signals as bounds on willingness to pay. Sufficient information exists in the 
instructions to deduce that each individual has a dividend structure such that 
each individual's total dividend earnings are linear in the number of certificates 
held. Such a return structure suggests that in the absence of speculative pur- 
chases each transacted price indicates a lower bound on the buyer's willingness 
to pay. For example, it is hard to understand why subject one would sell subject 
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two an asset for twenty francs if one just sold an asset to -two for thirty francs in 
the previous year and one knows that two has a perfectly flat return structure 
(but doesn't know two's limit price). From the previous transactions individual 
one has reason to suspect (especially in period B where there is less opportunity 
to speculate) that he/she could hold out for thirty. In the experiments one 
observes trades transacted atpi and then observes subsequent trades in the same 
period and in later periods transacted at P2' where P2 < p,. This frequency of 
overlapping can be seen in Figures 2-6. 
A second observation which seems surprising is the lack of willingness of most 
individuals to attempt to earn short-term capital gains. Because much of the 
trading was out of equilibrium and an upward trend in period A prices was fairly 
well established in the early years, intratemporal arbitrage opportunities 
abounded. Even in period B the typical pattern of prices within a period started 
low and increased at the end of the period. Yet such arbitrage rarely occurred. 
This makes us suspicious of theories of the first type which suggest that equilibria 
are the result of short-term risky speculation. 
A third observation is related to learning. We originally had thought that 
experience might be an important factor since it seemed likely that inexperienced 
subjects required several market years to become completely comfortable with 
trading rules, recording methods, etc. For this reason experienced subjects were 
used in Experiments 3, 4, and 5. Although convergence with experienced subjects 
seems to occur somewhat faster than with inexperienced subjects, the same 
general patterns of convergence to equilibrium are present in the data with both 
sets of subject pools. Thus, even though experienced subjects were used, the 
necessity for having done this is not at all evident. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Our conclusions are discussed in three sections. The first section deals with the 
technical models and what has been empirically established (subject, of course, 
to further replication). The second section concerns itself with the methodologi- 
cal questions alone. The final section deals with conclusions of a more general 
nature. 
It is clear that the rational expectations equilibrium (i.e., the perfect foresight 
equilibrium) model is an excellent predictor of the behavior in these simple 
markets. The role of replication is also clear in the markets. In particular, for 
sequential markets such as those studied here without a futures market, replica- 
tion is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the applicability of the 
perfect foresight equilibrium model. Necessity is established because the markets 
do not converge in the first period. Sufficiency is established by convergence of 
all markets after replication. Of course, exactly how this result extends to more 
complicated situations remains to be determined. 
With these findings the results of Miller, Plott, and Smith [11] and Plott and 
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Uhl [14] can be reinterpreted as having provided some experience with the 
behavior of asset markets. Units in those experiments can be viewed as assets 
which yield zero dividend returns to the traders5 and the equilibria can corre- 
spondingly be viewed as rational expectations equilibria. Of course the absence 
of intraperiod trading possibilities (which prevents the intraperiod speculation) 
and the adjustments on the supply side to aid the equating of market prices over 
time remove some of the important structural features of asset markets but the 
application of theory to explain the data is clear. 
The convergence pattern in these markets is reminiscent of a dynamic pro- 
gramming algorithm. We have called it the "swingback hypothesis." The last 
period converges first and the convergence works back from this to earlier 
periods as the years replicate. Thus, information about prices seems to be the 
critical variable as the theory suggests. This conclusion is reinforced with the 
addition of a futures market. It is reasonable to conjecture that the transmission 
of information about future prices speeds the convergence of the period A spot 
market. 
The observed price convergence has a pattern which supports another theoreti- 
cal interpretation. The appropriate model may have the markets converging to a 
temporary (naive) equilibrium first and then adjusting to the perfect foresight 
equilibrium after "sufficient" information has accumulated (Grandmont [5]). 
Other experimental evidence suggests that a market has converged to an equilib- 
rium when there is "low variance" of transacted prices around the average. This 
evidence may be used to support a conjecture that Experiments 1 and 2 
converged to the naive equilibrium in year 2, and Experiment 3 converged in 
year 1 (see Figures 2-4). 
Several new experimental features were introduced in these experiments. The 
use of special currency seems to cause no problems. And, the truncation of 
profits seems to leave behavior unperturbed. For example, a comparison of the 
behavior of these markets with those reported in Smith [16], which also had 
rectangular demands and supplies, yields few differences. The lack of a trading 
commission is thought to prevent "full convergence" (Plott and Smith [13]) but 
almost all experiments reported here were within $.03 of predicted perfect 
foresight equilibrium prices in dollar terms. 
There are several general implications which follow from the results above. 
(a) Any theory which advocates the general absence of regularities related to the 
underlying economic parameters of asset markets is demonstrably wrong. Thus, 
those who accept such a position must begin to adopt qualifications. (b) Because 
these markets never converged to the perfect foresight equilibrium during the 
first period, a strict rational expectations theory which does not require replica- 
tion is inconsistent with the data. Similarly, the efficient market hypothesis can 
be rejected to the extent that it postulates immediate and instantaneous adjust- 
ments. Replication necessarily plays an important role in determining the appli- 
51n these experiments traders had the exclusive right to purchase units in period A for resale in 
period B, but they could not sell units in period A or purchase units in period B. 
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cability of these models, and theories which address the question of how rational 
expectations are formed should be given serious consideration. (c) The study of 
futures market institutions can be supplemented by experimental techniques. 
Danthine [1] and Grossman [7] suggest that futures markets can play an 
important role in publicizing the private information which exists in an economy. 
Our initial probe with a single experiment establishes the feasibility of creating a 
controlled-environment futures market which has some of the properties they 
suggest will exist. A comparison of the observations from the first four markets 
with the fifth leads us to conjecture that the existence of a futures market affects 
the spot market. A futures market may increase the speed with which informa- 
tion is made public through price transactions. We suspect that this increases the 
speed of convergence to equilibrium, perhaps removes the necessity of replica- 
tion, and might increase market efficiency. All of these conjectures were sup- 
ported in the single futures market we studied. 
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APPENDIX 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENTS 1-4 
GENERAL 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations 
have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully 
and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you 
in cash. 
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you will buy and sell certificates in 
a sequence of market years. Each year consists of two periods, the first of which will be called A, and 
the second B. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labeled information and record sheet, 
which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this 
information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
francs. Each franc is worth dollars to you. Do not reveal this number to anyone. At the end of 
the experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. 
Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
Your profits come from two sources-from collecting certificate earnings on all certificates you 
hold at the end of a period and from buying and selling certificates. During each market year you are 
free to purchase or sell as many certificates as you wish provided you follow the rules below. For each 
certificate you hold at the end of the period you will be given the number of francs listed on row 19 
of your information and record sheet. Notice that this amount may differ from period to period. 
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Compute your total certificate earnings for a period by multiplying the earnings per certificate by the 
number of certificates held. That is, 
(number of certificates held) x (earnings per certificate) = total certificate earnings. 
Suppose for example that you hold 5 certificates at the end of period A of year 1. If for that period 
your earnings are 100 francs per certificate (that is, the number listed on row 19 is 100) then your 
total certificate earnings in period A would be 5 x 100 = 500 francs. This number should be recorded 
on row 19 at the end of the period. 
Sales from your certificate holdings increase your francs on hand by the amount of the sale price. 
Similarly, purchases reduce your francs on hand by the amount of the purchase price. Thus you can 
gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of certificates. At the end of period B of each year all 
your holdings are automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0. 
At the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial holding of certificates. This is 
recorded on row 0 of period A in each year's information and record sheet. You may sell these if you 
wish or you may hold them. If you hold a certificate throughout both periods, then you receive 
"earnings per certificate" twice-once at the end of period A, and again at the end of period B. 
Notice therefore that for each certificate you hold initially you can earn during the year at least the 
sum of the two "earnings per certificate" you receive at the end of periods A and B. You earn this 
amount if you do not sell that certificate during the entire year. 
In addition at the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial amount of francs on 
hand. This is also recorded on row 0 of period A on each year's information and record sheet. You 
may keep this if you wish or you may use it to purchase certificates. 
Thus at the beginning of each year you are endowed with holdings of certificates and francs on 
hand. You are free to buy and sell certificates as you wish according to the rules below. Your francs 
on hand at the end of a year are determined by your initial amount of francs on hand, earnings on 
certificate holdings at the end of each period and by gains and losses from purchases and sales of 
certificates. All francs on hand at the end of a year in excess of francs are yours to keep. These 
are your profits for the year. 
TRADING AND RECORDING RULES 
(1) All transactions are for one certificate at a time. After each of your sales or purchases you 
must record the nature of the transaction, a sale (S) or purchase (P), and the transaction price. The 
first transaction is recorded on row (1) and succeeding transactions are recorded on subsequent rows. 
(2) After each transaction you must calculate and record your new holdings of certificates and 
your new francs on hand. Your holdings of certificates may never go below zero. Your francs on 
hand may never go below zero. 
(3) At the end of the period record your total certificate earnings on row 19. Compute your end of 
period totals on row 20 by listing certificate holdings and adding total certificate earnings to your 
francs on hand. 
(4) The totals on row 20 at the end of period A should carry forward to row 0 of the next period. 
(5) At the end of period B, subtract from your francs on hand the amount listed in row 21 and 
enter this new amount on row 22. This is your profit for the market year and is yours to keep. At the 
end of each market year, record this number on your profit sheet. 
(6) At the end of the experiment add up your total profit on your profit sheet and enter this sum 
on row 15 of your profit sheet. To convert this number into dollars, multiply by the number on row 
16 and record the product on row 17. The experimenter will pay you this amount of money. 
MARKET ORGANIZATION 
The market for these certificates is organized as follows. The market will be conducted in a series 
of years each consisting of two periods. Each period lasts for 7 minutes. Anyone wishing to purchase 
a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate at a specified 
price, and anyone with certificates to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone 
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PROFIT SHEET 
Market 
Row Year Profit 
11 
2 2 
14 14 
15 Total Profit (in Francs) | _ l 
16 Dollars Per Franc 
17 Total Dollar Profit 
NAME 
TRADER NUMBER 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET 
YEAR 
PERIOD A PERIOD B 
Certifi- Francs Certifi- Francs 
cate on cate on 
Row Holdings Hand Holdings Hand 
Beginning of Period 
Francs on Hand and 
Certificate Holdings 0 
S S 
or TRANSACTION or TRANSACTION 
P PRICE P PRICE 
2 
181I 
Total Certificate p 18 l certificate 
Earnings 19 per certificate per certificate 
End of Period 
Totals 20 
21 
22 End of Year Profit 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 15:25:19 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
564 R. FORSYTHE, T. R. PALFREY, AND C. R. PLOTT 
wishing to sell a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal offer to sell one 
certificate at a specified price. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a 
single certificate, and the contracting parties will record the transaction on their information and 
record sheets. Any ties in bids or acceptance will be resolved by random choice. Except for the bids 
and their acceptance, you are not to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that 
are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
PRACTICE CALCULATIONS 
(The substance and much of the wording has been preserved but the format of the practice 
calculations has been changed to conserve space.) 
1. Suppose that at the beginning of period A your initial certificate holding is 1 and your initial 
francs on hand are 0. Suppose your earnings per certificate are 10 and 15 in periods A and B, 
respectively, and each year you are allowed to keep all francs on hand in excess of 0. If you hold 
onto your certificate for the entire year, that is, you do not make any transaction in period A or 
period B certificates, then calculate total certificate earnings in period A, end of period francs on 
hand in period A, total certificate earnings in period B, end of period francs on hand in period B, and 
profit for the year. 
2. Suppose that at the beginning of period A your initial certificate holding is 1 and your initial 
francs on hand are 100. Your earnings per certificate are 10 in period A and 15 in period B. Each 
year you are allowed to keep all francs on hand in excess of 100. Listed below are seven possible 
series of trading activities which would be legal for you to do in any given year. In each case you are 
asked to compute your profit for the year. (i) Make no transactions in period A certificates or period 
B certificates; (ii) sell one period A certificate for 20, make no transaction in period B certificates; 
(iii) make no transaction in period A certificates, sell one period B certificate; (iv) purchase one 
period A certificate for 20, make no transaction in period B certificates; (v) make no transaction in 
period A certificates, purchase one period B certificate for 20; (vi) sell one period A certificate for 20, 
purchase one period B certificate for 20; (vii) purchase one period A certificate for 20, sell one period 
B certificate for 20. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 5 
GENERAL 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations 
have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully 
and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you 
in cash. 
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you will buy and sell certificates in 
a sequence of market years. Each year consists of two periods, the first of which will be called A, and 
the second B. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labeled information and record sheet, 
which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this 
information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
francs. Each franc is worth dollars to you. Do not reveal this number to anyone. At the end of 
the experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. 
Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
Your profits come from two sources-from collecting certificate earnings on all certificates you 
hold at the end of a period and from buying and selling certificates. During each mnarket year you are 
free to purchase or sell as many certificates as you wish provided you follow the rules below. For each 
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certificate you hold at the end of the period you will be given the number of francs listed on row 31 
of your information and record sheet. Notice that this amount may differ from period to period. 
Compute your total certificate earnings for a period by multiplying the earnings per certificate by the 
number of certificates held. That is, 
(number of certificates held) x (earnings per certificate) = total certificate earnings. 
Suppose for example that you hold 5 certificates at the end of period A of year 1. If for the period 
your earnings are 100 francs per certificate (that is, the number listed on row 31 is 100) then your 
total certificate earnings in period A would be 5 X 100 = 500 francs. This number should be recorded 
on row 31 at the end of the period. 
Sales from your certificate holdings increase your francs on hand by the amount of the sale price. 
Similarly, purchases reduce your francs on hand by the amount of the purchase price. Thus you can 
gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of certificates. At the end of period B of each year all 
your holdings are automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0. 
At the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial holding of certificates. This is 
recorded on row 0 of period A in each year's information and record sheet. You may sell these if you 
wish or you may hold them. If you hold a certificate throughout both periods, then you receive 
"earnings per certificate" twice-once at the end of period A, and again at the end of period B. 
Notice therefore that for each certificate you hold initially you can earn during the year at least the 
sum of the two "earnings per certificate" you receive at the end of periods A and B. You earn this 
amount if you do not sell that certificate during the entire year. 
All trading for holdings of certificates in period B takes place in period A. Therefore, in period A, 
you may make the following two types of trades: 
(1) You may purchase (or sell) a certificate to hold throughout both periods. These are called 
period A certificates. 
(2) You may purchase (or sell) certificates to hold in only one period. These are called period B 
certificates since if you purchase it, you hold it only during period B. Note that if you sell a period B 
certificate you hold it only during period A and the trader you sell it to holds it during period B. 
In addition at the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial amount of francs on 
hand. This is also recorded on row 0 of period A on each year's information and record sheet. You 
may keep this if you wish or you may use it to purchase certificates. 
Thus at the beginning of each year you are endowed with holdings of certificates and francs on 
hand. You are free to buy and sell certificates as you wish according to the rules below. Your francs 
on hand at the end of a year are determined by your initial amount of francs on hand, earnings on 
certificate holdings at the end of each period and by gains and losses from purchases and sales of 
certificates. All francs on hand at the end of a year in excess of francs are yours to keep. These 
are your profits for the year. 
TRADING AND RECORDING RULES 
(1) All transactions are for one certificate at a time. After each of your sales or purchases you 
must record the nature of the transaction, a sale (S) or purchase (P), and the transaction price. The 
first transaction is recorded on row (1) and succeeding transactions are recorded on subsequent rows. 
(2) After each transaction for a period A certificate you must calculate and record your new 
holdings of certificates and your new francs on hand. Your holdings of certificates may never go 
below zero. 
(3) After each transaction for a period B certificate, you must record the net sales of period B 
certificates in the "Net Sales" column of period B. The number in this column must never exceed the 
number in the "Certificate Holdings" column of period A. 
(4) At the end of period B your total certificate holdings is equal to your total certificate holdings 
in period A minus your "net sales" of period X certificates. 
(5) At the end of the period record your total certificate earnings on row 31 and list your total 
certificate holdings on row 32. 
(6) At the end of period B, add your total certificate earnings in both periods to your francs on 
hand, and enter this amount on row 32. Subtract from your francs on hand the amount listed in row 
33 and enter this new amount on row 34. This is your profit for the market year and is yours to keep. 
At the end of each market year, record this number on your profit sheet. 
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(7) At the end of the experiment add up your total profit on your profit sheet and enter this sum 
on row 15 of your profit sheet. To convert this number into dollars, multiply by the number on row 
16 and record the product on row 17. The experimenter will pay you this amount of money. 
MARKET ORGANIZATION 
The market for these certificates is organized as follows. The market will be conducted in a series 
of years each consisting of two periods. Trading for both periods will be done in period A. This 
period will last minutes. Anyone wishing to purchase a certificate is free to raise his or her hand 
and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate at a specified price, and anyone with certificates to sell is 
free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a certificate is free to raise his or 
her hand and make a verbal offer to sell one certificate at a specified price. When making a bid or 
offer, you must specify whether you wish to buy or sell a period A or period B certificate. If a bid or 
offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single certificate, and the contracting 
parties will record the transaction on their information and record sheets. Any ties in bids or 
acceptance will be resolved by random choice. Except for the bids and their acceptance, you are not 
to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free 
to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
The profit sheet for Experiment 5 was the same as that for the other experiments. The information 
and record sheet for Experiment 5 differed in that the francs-on-hand inventory was carried in a 
single column on the right-hand side of the form as opposed to the two columns shown on the form 
above under period A and period B. 
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